The paper analyzes the options open to monopoly firms that sell Internet services. We consider two groups of customers that are different in their reservation prices. The monopoly uses price discrimination between customers by producing two versions of the product at positive price for high-quality product and a free version at zero price for lower-quality product. The monopoly can sell advertising space to increase its revenue but risks losing customers who are annoyed by advertising. Network externalities increase the incentive to increase output; thus we find cases where the profit maximization is consistent with maximum social welfare.
I
The software industry has been characterized in a market where two different products or services are sold at different prices. Some firms offer a simple version for free, while more advanced programs that require backup services are sold to customers who pay a monthly service subscription fee. Some examples can be given below.
1. Email service (e.g. Hotmail and Yahoo) offer free email services with limited storage ability (2 or 4 mega bytes) or limited size of attachment. While these services are offered for free, subscribing and paying a membership fee allows customers a more advanced email system etc. 2. Adobe Acrobat Reader is a simple program that reads a PDF (portable document format) document. Usually any computer user can access the lower-quality service for free (e.g. Reader 6). However, improved programs, such as Reader 7, 8 and 9, require a monthly payment. An advanced guidebook with instructions is supplied to holders of licencepaid programs. In recent versions of this program, documents can be edited, converted to different formats and are electronically transferable-enabling easy and convenient online viewing and printing.
A variety of services and prices is required because customers are nonhomogeneous in their tastes, needs and characteristics. 3. Another example is the very popular 'Dating' and 'Blind Dates' sites that offer different services to customers. Usually, the site offers online registration on the Internet for free, and in turn the agency obtains information such as personal names of customers, their age, profession, hobbies etc., and their various contact details. In addition, each member is usually required to fill in a questionnaire about the characteristic details of the person they would like to meet. A non-member cannot connect and communicate with anyone. He can leave a message to be called by a specific member, but he cannot initiate a direct communication to the member.
The member who pays a monthly fee has, in addition to the regular service, the ability to send a message to the site and can receive any information either from non-members or from subscribed members. Nonmembers can receive messages from subscribed members only, but not from other non-members. This matter was recently discussed by Bernard and Bruno (2003) who assessed Internet sites that offer membership with advanced services and discuss the question of whether this initiates a more effective externality effect. They mention for example the 'Dating Site' and ask what the owner of this site should do. Should the owner offer advanced services with more qualification and various types of membership in order to promote customers' entry into the site?
In addition to these standard sources of revenue, the monopoly receives more revenue from companies who add links to computer business home pages where information is advertised and distributed. Adding standard information services via the Internet, combined with commercials that feature information and exposing (willing and/or unwilling) customers to these commercials may increase revenue.
The information delivery monopoly may consider different kinds of policies to achieve its goal of profit maximization and we focus on what the social welfare implications are of various possible policies that could be practised by the monopoly. As we know from earlier literature, positive network externalities are internalized/considered by profit-maximizing monopolies that are encouraged to expand production levels. This well-known phenomenon was already discussed by Rohlfs (1974) . The results of our paper are that, under specific circumstances, the monopoly is able to attain the first best solution, i.e. the social welfare optimum is identical to the profit-maximizing monopoly solution.
We examine below different policies used by the monopoly. The first possible policy is to allow any customer to have access to and use of information for free, by removing all protective devices both from simple and basic services and from the more sophisticated and qualified services. The source of income comes only from advertisement. This policy leads to a large number of customers using the site's information. These customers are then exposed either willingly or unwillingly to advertisements sold by the site owner to companies charging them payments that are proportional to the number of customers who enter the site and are exposed to the commercial.
The second policy is to differentiate (or even discriminate) between some customers who receive free basic information and service, and other customers who pay a monthly fee for advanced and high-quality information and service. However, under this policy, despite discriminating/differentiating prices of services, all customers who use the site in either level of service are exposed to advertising that indirectly generates revenue to the site's owner.
The third policy is to differentiate between free of fee for basic service and membership fee for advanced service, giving only the members the option to avoid undesirable advertisements.
The fourth policy consists of full protection of all basic or high-quality services where the site owner charges all customers for any information or service used by them, and yet all customers are exposed to the full array of advertising.
The fifth possible policy of the monopolist is to charge for all services used by all customers and to add an additional periodic charge for the convenience of not being exposed to advertising while using the services provided by the website.
The path-breaking paper of Conner and Rumelt (1991) addresses the question as to whether a software publisher should pursue a strategy of software protection or allow some pirating by customers (i.e. free use of software products). The main benefit of allowing free use by customers is the advantage of increasing returns to scale. By having more users (even free users) the benefit of legitimacy of who pays for the service or product increases (with positive network externalities in the use of the software).
1 The tradeoff between revenue losses by removing protection devices, thus allowing a freefor-all policy, and the revenue and benefit gain as a result of network externalities is examined. Shy and Thisse (1999) extend the analysis to a duopoly situation deriving the conditions under which the free entry and use of software positively affect both the producer revenues and the social welfare. They conclude similarly to Conner and Rumelt (1991) that returns to scale in the network industry 'support' free use of software. Our main contribution lies in the combining of price differentiation for varying service levels with the option of generat-ing revenues from different sources of advertising and showing how these combinations affect social welfare.
Several articles analyzed the influences of free downloadable products from the Internet on the demand for software staff. The breakthrough paper by Conner and Rumelt (1991) concludes that free downloads have two contradictory effects on the revenues and profit of software suppliers. On the one hand they lead to a direct reduction in sales to potential customers, while on the other hand they lead to an indirect increase in sales. This may occur when more users of the programs increase the benefit of other customers. Increasing returns to a scale of this kind may encourage software suppliers to allow free entry and use of their services. This issue was also discussed recently by Shy (2003, 2004) who examined music piracy. They show that, if network externalities exist, it is worthwhile to allow free recording. The losses due to free use can be compensated for by taxing hardware and transferring it to the software industry, as well as payment accrued from record companies and the musicians. Their conclusion regarding avoiding membership fees is similar to ours; however, the whole issue of revenue from advertising that can compensate for the loss induced by free use is not discussed by them.
Another aspect is the question of software protection and the efficient ways to avoid illegal use or installation of software. Recently Banerjee (2003) , Chen and Png (2003) and Poddar (2003) discussed this issue, stating the case where by some cost the illegal download phenomenon should be stopped. They develop a model where installation of devices from illegal use reduces the number of users and thus the social welfare. Alternatively, the producer may consider an appropriate price that increases the number of legal users resulting in higher social welfare. In contrast to their conclusion, Banerjee (2003) shows that free use without enforcement of government to protect downloading of any kind is even better from the society's welfare point of view.
A different perspective on illegal downloading activity is developed by Poddar (2003) . By increasing direct and indirect costs of illegal users, illegal activity can be avoided or at least significantly reduced. Even if the direct cost of illegal use is low, the indirect cost can be that illegal customers get lowquality software and take a risk in causing possible damage to their computer operating system.
The above papers follow much of the literature regarding illegal copying of intellectual property, such as documents, articles and papers from original books and journals (see Novos and Waldman, 1984; Johnson, 1985; Liebowitz, 1985; Besen and Kirby, 1989) .
The main claim derived from these works is that publishers can gain higher profit by copyright elimination. By allowing free copying from the original publisher, more profit can be gained. For example, when libraries or public institutions are charged much higher prices for books and journals compared with private individuals, it might be beneficial for the publishers to charge even higher prices to the libraries in exchange for eliminating the copyright laws associated with copying material. Accordingly, the library can charge an entry fee to many more consumers who benefit from free copying to a greater extent. The additional revenue from price discrimination between public and private consumers may be larger than the losses acquired from either avoiding the copying charge or the sale decrease in the private sector. This kind of price discrimination between different kinds of customer groups and different levels of quality demanded as well as different levels of compulsory advertisement is discussed in our paper.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The main part of the paper (Section 2) considers some alternative policies of a monopoly that includes prices for subscribers and non-subscribers as well as exposure to advertisements, and compares the optimal solution of profit maximization with the social welfare solution. We show several scenarios where the solution of the monopoly and the social optimum are similar. The welfare comparison and the policy implication are derived in Section 3.
THE MODEL
The assumptions of the model are as follows.
1. We consider a market with 2h consumers who are interested in receiving some degree of software services supplied by a monopoly. The monopoly supplies two different kinds of services: (i) a basic program with low level and low quality of service and (ii) a more advanced program with high-quality service including many characteristics that are absent in the basic service. An example can be taken from Acrobat Reader (a basic program) versus Acrobat Reader and Writer (a more advanced software). 2. The revenue of the monopoly is either from selling services of two different values or by selling advertisements to firms who are interested in this kind of advertisement that is imposed on the 2h consumers who have access to the site and service supplied by the monopoly, and may be exposed willingly or unwillingly to the commercials. 3. The monopoly may consider five different policies and opt for only one policy that maximizes profit.
(a) To supply and allow free full access to the site and to all services to the 2h customers, while selling the advertising possibilities to outside firms and forcing all 2h customers to view the commercials. (b) To allow only basic service for free to some customers advertised by the firms, and charge a monthly fee for the high-quality services provided to them. The advertising is forced on all customers. (c) To allow basic service for free to customers who in effect pay the price by being forced to view commercials, while high-quality service customers can avoid being subjected to commercial viewing, but voluntarily have the option to click on the commercial page, if they so wish. (d) To supply only advanced and high-quality service for those who pay a periodic fee, but all users are subjected to advertising. (e) To supply only high-quality service to members who pay the fee and still they have the choice of paying an additional monthly fee to avoid the advertising. 4. The heterogeneity of customers can result from differences of socioeconomic background such as the following.
(a) Different wage rates affecting the demand for different qualities of services. For example, high-wage earners desire high-quality service and may desire to avoid advertising because of their time value, which would not be the case with low-wage earners. (b) More qualified and talented customers can save money by buying low service levels from the company. (c) Customers with free time may enjoy advertising. 5. The monopoly offers high-quality service only to customers who pay a periodical fee, delivering only two quality levels of service. 6. The monopolies can attain a high profit level by combining different pricing policies for different qualities of services and by charging for commercials posted by companies according to the members and the structure of the site's users.
We will now discuss the five different policies mentioned above in assumption 3.
In the model below we discuss the price strategy in the software industry when a monopoly chooses either to supply the software program for free or to charge each customer a membership fee.
The monopoly supplies a program by a site on the Internet. There are heterogeneous customers where type O customers are support-oriented consumers who benefit from a more advanced program, willing to pay a membership fee for the services, while type I customers are support-independent consumers, who have no benefit from advanced services, but only a regular service that they receive for free.
Thus, each consumer in the society faces three possibilities and has to choose one out of the following three alternatives:
1. to sign and pay a membership fee for the service; 2. to receive the same service for free; 3. not to use the service at all. q customers from the population use (either for free or by paying a fee) the services. The utility of each individual is increased when more customers use the service.
This phenomenon of increasing returns to scale in the network industry is very common, e.g. exchanging information or files from software is more beneficial as more customers are involved in the market. This approach follows Cabral et al. (1999) who discuss the issue of a monopoly that initiates new technology or promotes an entry of a durable good that may generate network externalities. The question then is what should be the price policy of such a monopoly. The monopoly can sell a small quantity at a high price that declines with time or alternatively sell more units to more customers by charging lower prices that increase with time. Their model concludes that the optimal policy is to initially start with low prices and by that to generate high benefit for the externalities and its positive effect on the utility of customers and their own demand. Below we depict conditions where the other alternative of initial high price is more profitable. These positive externalities emerge as a result of interaction between customers. On the one hand, the customers who benefit from advanced service have the following utility:
( 1) where p is the membership fee determined by the monopoly that is charged to each customer who is interested in advanced service. a is the value of the advanced program service and support of the service measured and evaluated by customer O. b measures the additional utility from commercial avoidance, and y is an additional payment that is charged to a customer who wants to avoid compulsory advertisement. f(q) represents the positive externalities on the utility of an individual customer who benefits from the use of other customers, where f ′ > 0 and f ″ < 0.
The monopoly considers two possibilities:
1. to charge a high-fee membership for type O customers; 2. to charge a low-fee membership for all customers. On the other hand, a customer who does not get a benefit from using the advanced service and still does or does not pay a fee towards the service has the following utility:
(2) Using equations (1) and (2) we can distinguish between customers of type O and type I as we define below:
Customers of type O prefer signing up for a membership fee instead of free use if
Customers of type I prefer free use for the basic service if
The monopoly gains directly from membership fees and/or indirectly from free users and from selling advertisements shown on the screen upon entering the site. The revenue gained by the monopoly from advertising firms depends on all site users: both those who pay for the site's service and those who receive it for free. The more customers exposed to commercials, the more the advertising firms pay money to the monopoly.
We can define the monopoly profit as
The monopoly profit depends on members who pay the fee, q m , as well as all q customers where q ≥ q m .
f is the cost of opening and activating the site, developing the program and other site costs (total fixed costs that are not affected by the number of users or entries into the site).
c is the constant marginal cost of supplying the service for each member who pays the fee, p, and m is the protection cost per customer to avoid a use without a payment.
The last four terms are r m , r nm , t m and t nm , where r m and r nm are the payments charged by the owner of the site (the monopoly) to advertising com- 
Profit Maximization and Social Optimum
panies resulting from members' viewing of commercials and non-members, respectively. t m is the actual frequency of voluntary viewing of advertisements by members, and t nm is the actual frequency of compulsory viewing by nonmembers or members.
The monopoly may generate two types of discrimination as follows:
1. discrimination of quality of service between members who pay a fee and non-members who do not pay a fee; 2. discrimination between customers with respect to advertisement exposure.
Members can avoid exposure to advertisements either by mandatory fee or by receiving this privilege for free. However, non-members are subject to 'compulsory exposure'. Members can voluntarily activate advertisements by opening the appropriate link and initiating the actual viewing on the computer screen at t m frequency. Non-members or members who are required to pay but do not wish to do so are exposed to commercial viewing at t nm frequency. The latter frequency of commercial exposure is larger than the former, i.e. t nm > t m . We also define r m and r nm as payments charged by the owner of the site (the monopoly) to advertising companies resulting from members' viewing of commercials and non-members, respectively.
The expected relationship between the two payments is r nm > r m . Accordingly, the advertising company is prepared to pay the fee per customer viewing, while the monopoly has the discretion to charge an even higher fee for commercials viewed by non-members.
Two reasons for the above expected relationship related to the response of the site owner and subscribed members are explained as follows.
1. Watching commercials by a member who pays a fee and whose time value is high is very expensive; therefore, he will try to avoid commercial viewings and influences. This means that the efficiency of commercials issued by the advertising companies on the brainwashing of the members is lower and so they are prepared to pay less for broadcasting them. 2. The site owner can optionally prevent members from commercial viewing, while exposing non-members to more advertising and to becoming more influenced by commercial viewings. The efficiency of commercials for viewers who spend enough time searching specific products displayed in advertisements leads to the advantage of the companies who benefit from the advertisements and are therefore prepared to pay more to 'brainwash' non-members. Thus, we can conclude it is more likely that r m < r nm .
From the monopoly's general profit function, we can derive several pricing strategies. The optimal solution from the profit point of view is compared with the optimal solution from a social welfare perspective.
As mentioned in Section 1 the monopoly may consider five possibilities:
(a) Non-protection policy for all users, where a basic service is supplied for free. (b) Non-protection policy combined with possible membership fee, where a basic service is supplied for free, and advanced service is supplied for a membership fee. (c) Non-protection policy combined with membership and no advertising option for a member avoiding advertisements. The monopoly may consider two values of membership fee, high and low, and choose the high fee.
2 (d) Protection policy with no possibility of avoiding exposure to advertising. In this case no service is distributed for free. (e) Protection policy with the possibility of avoiding advertisements. In this case no service is distributed for free, but the monopoly charges extra for no compulsory advertisements.
We discuss in this paper only three cases, (b), (c) and (e), where the profitmaximizing monopoly generates the same solution that is identical to the social optimum solution.
We investigate the reasons and under what conditions the monopoly solution is indeed identical to the social optimum.
(b) Non-protection Policy Combined with Possible Membership Fee
In this case, the advanced service and high-quality information are protected, and are thus reserved for members who pay an entrance fee. However, other customers can access the basic service for free. All types of customers are exposed to advertisements. Type O customers pay a fee and type I avoid payment.
Therefore, the monopoly can charge a high entry fee, p, for advanced services derived from the following: (4) Thus, the optimal fee, p, is p b = a f (2h). The price in equation (4) is the equilibrium price of monopoly. At this price customers of type O are indifferent to paying for advanced service or receiving free use of the basic service. An infinite price increase causes type O customers to avoid paying the fee while customers of type I will tend to choose free basic service so the monopoly also avoids price reduction too. Because no entry of customers of type I occurs while price reduction leads to profit losses from type O customers, the monopoly has no incentive to
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The type O customer gains the utility U 0 = (1 + a)f(2h) − r = f(2h), while the utility of type I customers is U 1 = f(2h), due to the fact that a type I customer does not benefit from returns to scale a, but only from the use of all customers.
The consumers' surplus is (6) and social welfare, W b , in this case will be a simple summation of all consumers' surplus and producer profits. Thus,
Figures 1 and 2 represent the demand for advanced service by all customers and the profit derived as a function of those who are full-service members. Figure 2 describes the relationship between monopoly profit and the 'entrance fee'. At zero fee advanced service leads to profit generated from advertisements only, but as price is positive and a f (2h) increases, profit is
The Manchester School The reason why p b derived by the monopoly in the above case maximizes the social optimum is because of the specific distribution of the two types of customers. At p b = a f(2h), all customers' surplus from network externalities is squeezed from the consumers of type O by the monopoly. Furthermore, there is discontinuity in the price distribution, such that an infinite decrease in price does not encourage additional customers of type I to join the advanced service supplied and just reduces the profit by exactly marginal profit that is equal to the marginal benefit/surplus of customers of type O. This means that there are no deadweight losses as a result of price reduction.
However, any infinite increase in price above optimal p b brings all customers of type O to use only the free basic service and minimizes monopoly profit significantly by having profit just from advertisement fees. This is a stable and an efficient solution. 
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(c) No-protection Policy Combined with Membership Fee that Covers Advanced Service and Compulsory Advertisement
Free entry for basic services is offered, and for a membership fee both advanced services and the privilege of avoiding advertisements are incurred. In this case, a type I customer can receive the basic service but cannot avoid viewing of advertisements, while a type O customer who pays for advanced services is able to avoid advertising without paying an additional fee. The latter can view commercials by choice, i.e. by clicking on the link for entry to the advertising site; otherwise, he is able to avoid them.
Only h consumers of type O pay a membership fee; thus the highest price they are willing to pay is (8) The monopoly profit is (9) The net utility of type O customers is While customers of type I get a basic service for free, their utility is U 1 where This indicates some utility for every type of customer, and also that the utility of type O customers is induced from the service use of other customers.
(10)
The social welfare is (11) Figure 3 illustrates the demand for service while the monopoly determines the free basic service forcing customers to view commercials, but members who pay a fee can avoid the commercial with no extra charge. loss is generated. However, a decrease in the price by an infinitely small value does not change the total number of type I or O customers. There is no switching process from being customer I into O. Thus, the price reduction does not change the total social welfare, but just leads to reallocation between less monopoly profit and more consumers' surplus that cancel. Case (c) is very similar to the basic policy of the monopoly in case (b), with one exception-the differences in the value of b, i.e. the disutility from the compulsory exposition to advertisement by all 2h customers. Therefore, the monopoly can charge a higher fee p c than p b , based on the information of the high level of b. This information can be revealed by research on consumers' preferences and behavior towards advertisements. Still the monopoly determines such a high price that distinguishes two types of customers: members who pay and benefit from the network externalities (a) and the benefit from avoiding compulsory advertisement (b).
(e) Protection Policy with the Possibility of Avoiding Advertisements
The monopoly can avoid entrance from free use of any kind with a protection cost per member m. In addition to the membership fee, the customer can eliminate advertisements by paying c.
In this case all customers (of types O and I) pay a membership fee. All 2h customers pay a fee in addition to y. Therefore, the monopoly can charge the maximum price derived from equation (12):
The profit of the monopoly is now (14) The consumers' surplus is derived from type O customers as follows: (15) In turn, the social welfare in this case is (16) In this case, too, all 2h customers (of types O and I) pay the relatively low membership fee and also pay a fee y as additional costs of avoiding compulsory advertisement. The monopoly finds that by exposing all customers to the advanced service, while just earning from all customers who are willing to be exposed voluntarily to advertisements, all kinds of distortion from com- pulsory behavior are eliminated, while the benefit to the monopoly like to the society as a whole from the network externalities is achieved. In contrast to the case where the monopoly forces all 2h members to be exposed to compulsory advertising and reduces the social welfare of society in order to increase its own profit, in such a case the monopoly leaves the economic agents more degrees of freedom by allowing some customers who dislike advertisements significantly (high value of b) to pay for and to benefit from eliminating this kind of compulsory advertising, which leads to the optimal social welfare solution that is determined by the monopoly.
The results of the three cases can be summarized in Table 1 . The conditions are as follows.
• If a 1 > [2f(2h) − 2m − c]/f(2h) (a is high) and bf (2h) + r m t m < r nm t nm (b is low), then the social planner and the monopoly choose case (b).
• If a 2 > (r m t m − r nm t nm − 2m − c)/f(2h) + b + 2 (a is high) and r nm t nm < bf (2h) + r m t m < r nm t nm + c (b has an intermediate/a median value), then the social planner and the monopoly choose case (c).
• If a 2 < (r m t m − r nm t nm − 2m − c)/f(2h) + b + 2 (a is low) and r nm t nm < bf (2h) + r m t m < r nm t nm + c (b has an intermediate/a median value), then the social planner and the monopoly choose case (e).
C
In this paper we address the case of a monopoly in the software market that offers two levels of software services to distinct customer groups. The revenue of the monopoly is derived both from selling the product to the customers and from paid advertisements. The market is also characterized by network externalities in which customers' utility (and the price she is willing to pay) increases with the number of users (including free users).
The monopoly faces several policy and pricing options that involve the combination of price discrimination as well as involuntary exposure to advertisements.
For each of these options we calculate the level of private profit and social welfare. We found that the monopoly profit depends on three factors:
1. The degree of network externalities. A higher degree is an incentive for the monopoly to attract more users by offering free use. 2. The degree of disutility attributed to compulsory advertisement exposure. A high disutility level may lead the monopoly to eliminate compulsory advertisements from members (either for free or for fee) and expose more non-members to compulsory advertisements. 3. The price paid by marketers for advertisements installed in the site will affect both the prices charged by the monopoly and the availability of the non-advertisement option offered to subscribed members.
